Philosophy's New challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action

Mind and Language 26 (1):115-139 (2011)
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Abstract

Experimental philosophers have gathered impressive evidence for the surprising conclusion that philosophers' intuitions are out of step with those of the folk. As a result, many argue that philosophers' intuitions are unreliable. Focusing on the Knobe Effect, a leading finding of experimental philosophy, we defend traditional philosophy against this conclusion. Our key premise relies on experiments we conducted which indicate that judgments of the folk elicited under higher quality cognitive or epistemic conditions are more likely to resemble those of the philosopher. We end by showing how our experimental findings can help us better understand the Knobe Effect.

Author Profiles

Cecilea Mun
Arizona State University (PhD)
N. Ángel Pinillos
Arizona State University
Shyam Nair
Arizona State University

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