Logically Simple Properties and Relations

Philosophers' Imprint 16:1-40 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper presents an account of what it is for a property or relation (or ‘attribute’ for short) to be logically simple. Based on this account, it is shown, among other things, that the logically simple attributes are in at least one important way sparse. This in turn lends support to the view that the concept of a logically simple attribute can be regarded as a promising substitute for Lewis’s concept of a perfectly natural attribute. At least in part, the advantage of using the former concept lies in the fact that it is amenable to analysis, where that analysis—i.e., the account put forward in this paper—requires the adoption neither of an Armstrongian theory of universals nor of a primitive notion of naturalness, fundamentality, or grounding.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PLALSP
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-01-19
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-01-14

Total views
312 ( #14,699 of 51,671 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #37,138 of 51,671 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.