What Emotions Really Are (In the Theory of Constructed Emotion)

Philosophy of Science 85 (4):640-59 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Recently, Lisa Feldman Barrett and colleagues have introduced the Theory of Constructed Emotions (TCE), in which emotions are constituted by a process of categorizing the self as being in an emotional state. The view, however, has several counterintuitive implications: for instance, a person can have multiple distinct emotions at once. Further, the TCE concludes that emotions are constitutively social phenomena. In this article, I explicate the TCE*, which, while substantially similar to the TCE, makes several distinct claims aimed at avoiding the counterintuitive implications plaguing the TCE. Further, because of the changes that comprise the TCE*, emotions are not constitutively social phenomena.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
POBWER
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-09-14
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-09-14

Total views
2,063 ( #1,275 of 56,902 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
185 ( #2,587 of 56,902 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.