Infinitism and epistemic normativity

Synthese 178 (3):515-527 (2011)
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Abstract

Klein’s account of epistemic justification, infinitism, supplies a novel solution to the regress problem. We argue that concentrating on the normative aspect of justification exposes a number of unpalatable consequences for infinitism, all of which warrant rejecting the position. As an intermediary step, we develop a stronger version of the ‘finite minds’ objection.

Author Profiles

Adam C. Podlaskowski
Fairmont State University
Joshua Smith
Central Michigan University

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