Tournament decision theory

Noûs 56 (1):176-203 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The dispute in philosophical decision theory between causalists and evidentialists remains unsettled. Many are attracted to the causal view’s endorsement of a species of dominance reasoning, and to the intuitive verdicts it gets on a range of cases with the structure of the infamous Newcomb’s Problem. But it also faces a rising wave of purported counterexamples and theoretical challenges. In this paper I will describe a novel decision theory which saves what is appealing about the causal view while avoiding its most worrying objections, and which promises to generalize to solve a set of related problems in other normative domains.

Author's Profile

Abelard Podgorski
National University of Singapore


Added to PP

925 (#12,356)

6 months
242 (#7,524)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?