Tournament Decision Theory

Noûs (forthcoming)
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The dispute in philosophical decision theory between causalists and evidentialists remains unsettled. Many are attracted to the causal view’s endorsement of a species of dominance reasoning, and to the intuitive verdicts it gets on a range of cases with the structure of the infamous Newcomb’s Problem. But it also faces a rising wave of purported counterexamples and theoretical challenges. In this paper I will describe a novel decision theory which saves what is appealing about the causal view while avoiding its most worrying objections, and which promises to generalize to solve a set of related problems in other normative domains.
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First archival date: 2020-07-28
Latest version: 3 (2021-03-29)
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