Control, Attitudes, and Accountability

In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It seems that we can be directly accountable for our reasons-responsive attitudes—e.g., our beliefs, desires, and intentions. Yet, we rarely, if ever, have volitional control over such attitudes, volitional control being the sort of control that we exert over our intentional actions. This presents a trilemma: (Horn 1) deny that we can be directly accountable for our reasons-responsive attitudes, (Horn 2) deny that φ’s being under our control is necessary for our being directly accountable for φ-ing, or (Horn 3) deny that the relevant sort of control is volitional control. This paper argues that we should take Horn 3.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PORCAA-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-03-20
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-03-20

Total views
506 ( #12,624 of 64,109 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #13,923 of 64,109 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.