Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism

In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

IN THIS PAPER, I make a presumptive case for moral rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. And I argue that this view leads us to reject all traditional versions of act‐consequentialism. I begin by explaining how moral rationalism leads us to reject utilitarianism

Author's Profile

Douglas W. Portmore
Arizona State University

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,451 (#9,589)

6 months
147 (#26,478)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?