Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism
In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press (2011)
Abstract
IN THIS PAPER, I make a presumptive case for moral rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. And I argue that this view leads us to reject all traditional versions of actâ€consequentialism. I begin by explaining how moral rationalism leads us to reject utilitarianism
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2009-01-28
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22 ( #37,591 of 70,062 )
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