Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism

In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press (2011)
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Abstract
IN THIS PAPER, I make a presumptive case for moral rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. And I argue that this view leads us to reject all traditional versions of act‐consequentialism. I begin by explaining how moral rationalism leads us to reject utilitarianism
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.Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.)

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Probabilistic Promotion Revisited.Behrends, Jeff & DiPaolo, Joshua

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