Ranking judgments in Arrow’s setting

Synthese 173 (2):199-210 (2010)
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In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pettit. Ranking judgments were introduced in order to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets of judgments and Arrow’s theorem. I present a proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit to the conditions on the aggregation procedure.
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Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Pauly, Marc & van Hees, Martin
Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian

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