Explanatory Reasoning and Informativeness

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):433-443 (2023)
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Abstract

Bas van Fraassen has argued that explanatory reasoning does not provide confirmation for explanatory hypotheses because explanatory reasoning increases information and increasing information does not provide confirmation. We compare this argument with a skeptical argument that one should never add any beliefs because adding beliefs increases information and increasing information does not provide confirmation. We discuss the similarities between these two arguments and identify several problems with van Fraassen’s argument.

Author Profiles

Ted Poston
University of Alabama
Kevin McCain
University of Alabama, Birmingham

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