Just Imagining Things: Hume's Conception-Based Account of Cognition

Dissertation, University of Southern California (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Philosophers have routinely taken a pessimistic view of the account of cognition offered by David Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature, claiming that Hume's limited explanatory resources cannot capture the rich complexity of our thought, judgment, and reasoning. I provide a qualified defense of Hume's attempt to analyze a cognitive activity in terms of objectual conception, ie conceiving or imagining an object. I defend Hume from objections offered by his contemporary Thomas Reid (and echoed by various recent Hume scholars), presenting an interpretation of the account that resolves these worries.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
POWJIT-4
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-02-06
View other versions
Added to PP
2020-02-06

Downloads
194 (#38,058)

6 months
25 (#34,241)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?