Locke, Hume, and Reid on the Objects of Belief

History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (1):21-38 (2018)
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The goal of this paper is show how an initially appealing objection to David Hume's account of judgment can only be put forward by philosophers who accept an account of judgment that has its own sizable share of problems. To demonstrate this, I situate the views of John Locke, David Hume, and Thomas Reid with respect to each other, so as to illustrate how the appealing objection is linked to unappealing features of Locke's account of judgment.

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Lewis Powell
University at Buffalo


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