The Use of Force in a Theory of Meaning

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Abstract
This piece was written circa 1982–83, drawing in part on material from my PhD thesis (The Problem of the Single Case, Cambridge, 1981). In the thesis I proposed what would now be called an expressivist account of judgements of the form ‘It is probable that p’. One chapter, on which this paper builds, tried to defend the view against the Frege-Geach argument. This piece earned a revise and resubmit from Philosophical Review, but was never resubmitted. Parts of it made their way into my ‘Semantic Minimalism and the Frege Point’, in Tsohatzidis, S.L.(ed.), Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, Routledge, 1994, pp. 132–55 (reprinted in Naturalism without Mirrors, Oxford, 2011, ch. 3) – though that paper favours a different approach to the Frege-Geach argument, leaning more heavily on semantic minimalism. I’m putting this piece online to facilitate self-citation.
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First archival date: 2021-10-26
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