A new problem for the A-theory of time

Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):494-498 (2000)
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Abstract
: I offer a new approach to the increasingly convoluted debate between the A- and B-theories of time, the ‘tensed’ and ‘tenseless’ theories. It is often assumed that the B-theory faces more difficulties than the A-theory in explaining the apparently tensed features of temporal experience. I argue that the A-theory cannot explain these features at all, because on any physicalist or supervenience theory of the mind, in which the nature of experience is fixed by the physical state of the world, the tensed properties of time posited by the A-theory could play no role in shaping temporal experience. It follows that the A-theory is false; even a priori arguments for it fail, because they still require the tensed vocabulary which is used to describe temporal experience.
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References found in this work BETA
Real Time Ii.Mellor, D. H.
The Unreality of Time.McTaggart, J. Ellis
Language and Time.Smith, Quentin
The New Theory of Time.Oaklander, L. Nathan & Smith, Quentin (eds.)

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Citations of this work BETA
Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences.Baron, Samuel; Cusbert, John; Farr, Matt; Kon, Maria & Miller, Kristie

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2009-01-28

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