Semantyczna teoria prawdy a antynomie semantyczne [Semantic Theory of Truth vs. Semantic Antinomies]

Rocznik Filozoficzny Ignatianum 1 (27):341–363 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The paper presents Alfred Tarski’s debate with the semantic antinomies: the basic Liar Paradox, and its more sophisticated versions, which are currently discussed in philosophy: Strengthen Liar Paradox, Cyclical Liar Paradox, Contingent Liar Paradox, Correct Liar Paradox, Card Paradox, Yablo’s Paradox and a few others. Since Tarski, himself did not addressed these paradoxes—neither in his famous work published in 1933, nor in later papers in which he developed the Semantic Theory of Truth—therefore, We try to defend his concept of truth against these antinomies. It is demonstrated that Tarskian theory of truth is resistant to the paradoxes and it is still the best solution to avoid the antinomies and remain within a classical logic, that is, accepting the laws of noncontradiction, excluded middle, and the principle of bivalence. Thus, the goal of the paper is double—firstly, to show that none of the versions of the Liar Paradox’s is a serious threat to Tarski’s concept of truth, and secondly, that Semantic Theory of Truth allows to remain within classical logic, and at the same time, avoid antinomies—which makes it the most attractive among classical theories of truth.

Author's Profile

Jakub Pruś
Jesuit University Ignatianum In Cracow


Added to PP

15 (#77,769)

6 months
15 (#64,384)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?