Cohen’s Conservatism and Human Enhancement

The Journal of Ethics 17 (4):331-354 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In an intriguing essay, G. A. Cohen has defended a conservative bias in favour of existing value. In this paper, we consider whether Cohen’s conservatism raises a new challenge to the use of human enhancement technologies. We develop some of Cohen’s suggestive remarks into a new line of argument against human enhancement that, we believe, is in several ways superior to existing objections. However, we shall argue that on closer inspection, Cohen’s conservatism fails to offer grounds for a strong sweeping objection to enhancement, and may even offer positive support for forms of enhancement that preserve valuable features of human beings. Nevertheless, we concede that Cohen’s arguments may suggest some plausible and important constraints on the modality of legitimate and desirable enhancements
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PUGCCA
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-09-18
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-10-25

Total downloads
87 ( #21,674 of 35,800 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #16,661 of 35,800 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.