Lopsided Lives

In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 275-296 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Intuitively there are many different things that non-derivatively contribute to well-being: pleasure, desire satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, love, rationality, freedom, moral virtue, and appreciation of true beauty. According to pluralism, at least two different types of things non-derivatively contribute to well-being. Lopsided lives score very low in terms of some types of things that putatively non-derivatively contribute to well-being, but very high in terms of other such types of things. I argue that pluralists essentially face a trilemma about lopsided lives: they must either make implausible claims about how they compare in terms of overall well-being with more balanced lives, allow overall well-being to be implausibly hypersensitive to very slight nonevaluative differences, or else adopt implausible seeming limits on what things lives can contain or how much they can contribute to overall well-being. Such problems about lopsided lives thus push us away from pluralism and toward simpler theories of well-being, toward hedonism in particular. (This piece is the subject of Eden Lin’s paper “Well-Being and Hedonic Indispensability”.)
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PUMLL
Revision history
First archival date: 2017-03-15
Latest version: 2 (2018-09-02)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-03-15

Total views
118 ( #19,887 of 38,087 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
69 ( #5,234 of 38,087 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.