Thought, Color, and Intelligibility in the New Essays

In Wenchao Li (ed.), "Für Unser Glück oder das Glück Anderer": Vortrage des X. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, vol. 5. Georg Olms. pp. 49-57 (2016)
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I argue that Leibniz's rejection of the hypothesis of thinking matter on grounds of unintelligibility conflicts with his position on sensible qualities such as color. In the former case, he argues that thought must be a modification of something immaterial because we cannot explain thought in mechanical terms. In the latter case, however, he (rightly) grants that we cannot explain sensible qualities in mechanical terms, that is, cannot explain why a certain complex mechanical quality gives rise to the appearance of a certain sensible quality, even while insisting that sensible qualities are modifications of bodies. I argue that the two cases are analogous in the relevant respects, and that Leibniz's (plausible) position on sensible qualities should have thrown his Principle of Intelligibility into doubt.
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Leibniz's Mill Arguments Against Materialism.Stewart Duncan - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):250-72.

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