A Conflict between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation

Philosophy of Science 88 (3):385-397 (2021)
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According to the probabilistic relevance account of confirmation, E confirms H relative to background knowledge K just in case P(H/K&E) > P(H/K). This requires an inequality between the rational degree of belief in H determined relative to two bodies of total knowledge which are such that one (K&E) includes the other (K) as a proper part. In this paper, I argue that it is quite plausible that there are no two possible bodies of total knowledge for ideally rational agents meeting this requirement. Hence, the positive relevance account may have to be rejected.
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First archival date: 2020-09-16
Latest version: 2 (2020-12-18)
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