Mental causation, interventions, and contrasts (2006)

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The problem of mental causation is discussed by taking into account some recent developments in the philosophy of science. The problem is viewed from the perspective of the new interventionist theory of causation developed by Woodward. The import of the idea that causal claims involve contrastive classes in mental causation is also discussed. It is argued that mental causation is much less a problem than it has appeared to be.
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What Psychological States Are Not.Block, Ned & Fodor, Jerry A.

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The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences.Menzies, Peter & List, Christian

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