Ramsification and inductive inference

Synthese 187 (2):569-577 (2012)
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Abstract

An argument, different from the Newman objection, against the view that the cognitive content of a theory is exhausted by its Ramsey sentence is reviewed. The crux of the argument is that Ramsification may ruin inductive systematization between theory and observation. The argument also has some implications concerning the issue of underdetermination.

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Panu Raatikainen
Tampere University

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