No Outcome Is Good, Bad, or Evaluatively Neutral for Anyone

Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (5-6):654-670 (2024)
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Abstract

I argue that no outcome is good, bad, or evaluatively neutral for anyone. My argument concerns non-comparative personal evaluative properties alone; it does not support (say) the conclusion that no outcome is better for anyone than any other outcome. First I argue that there is a sequence of outcomes with the following properties, and that the existence of such a sequence supports the conclusion that no outcome is good for anyone: (i) the first member of the sequence is good for you if any outcome is good for you, (ii) any two adjacent members of the sequence are on a par for you, and (iii) the last member of the sequence is not good for you. I then defend similar arguments that no outcome is bad or evaluatively neutral for anyone. Thus, I conclude that no outcome is good, bad, or evaluatively neutral for anyone.

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