On Force, Effectiveness, and Law in Kelsen

In Gonzalo Villa Rozas, Jorge Emilio Núñez & Jorge L. Fabra-Zamora (eds.), Kelsenʼs Global Legacy. Essays on Legal and Political Philosophy. Bloomsbury Publishing (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The aim of this chapter is therefore to critically analyse Kelsen's position on the relationship between law and coercion. Here I will show that the connection between law and coercion in Kelsen's legal theory goes deeper than the first definition of ‘law as a coercive order’ suggests: the connection has to do not only with the specific content of legal norms, but also with the existence of the legal order itself. In Section II, I will show that for Kelsen coercion is an essential element of law as the criterion that allows to distinguish law qua normative and social order from other kinds of social and normative orders (such as religion and morality), i.e., coercion of a certain kind. In Sec-tion III I will further develop the argument and show that coercion is also the criterion that allows to distinguish legal norms from other norms (like moral norms), i.e., coercion as a specific object of norms which are hypothetical formulations with sanction as consequence. In Section IV I will show that, in Kelsen’s framework, coercion is also to be regarded as an essential element for the effectiveness of a legal order, thus for its very existence. I will further argue that in this view the most important effect of coercion is not the direct one – the effective application of sanctions or the effective exercise of force – but the indirect one – the psychological pressure that the mere existence of organised violence and sanctions exerts on the individual. Finally, in Section V I will offer a brief concluding remark.

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Julieta A. Rabanos
University of Belgrade

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