Scientism after its Discontents

Mεtascience 2 (2020)
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Abstract
Scientism has more notoriety than history proper for it has been identified with “positivism”, “reductionism”, “materialism” or “Marxism”, or even held responsible for the enforcement of science at the expense of other human affairs. The idea that scientific research yields the best possible knowledge lies at the very definition of “scientism”. However, even when science has shown a considerable amount of theoretical and practical successes, a rational confidence put on it as a mean for solving any factual problem has been denounced as illegitimate, defective, or dogmatic. Thereby, after revisiting the varieties of the meaning of scientism, I argue for a reasonable defense of scientism against some of its prevailing criticisms. Hence, it will be sustained that science is the most reliable approach for attaining knowledge without detriment of other valuable human activities insofar these do not address factual or cognitive questions nor are at odds with a scientific worldview.
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First archival date: 2020-10-16
Latest version: 2 (2020-10-17)
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