Why We Need a New Normativism about Collective Action

Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists about collective action, necessarily something and potentially quite a bit. They contend that collective action inherently involves a special normative status amongst participants, which may, for example, involve mutual obligations to receive the concurrence of the others before leaving. We build on recent empirical work whose results lend plausibility to a normativist account by further investigating the specific package of mutual obligations associated with collective action according to our everyday understanding. However, our results cast doubt on a proposed obligation to seek the permission of co-actors before exiting a collective action, and suggest instead that this obligation is a function of explicit promising. We then discuss how our results pave the path for a new normativism, a theory that neither under- nor overshoots the target given by our common conception of the interpersonal obligations present in collective action.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RACWWN
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-06-29
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-06-29

Total views
254 ( #24,417 of 2,445,378 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
254 ( #1,977 of 2,445,378 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.