A Defence of Intentionalism about Demonstratives

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 775-791 (2019)
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Intentionalism about demonstratives is the view that the referent of a demonstrative is determined solely by the speaker's intentions. Intentionalists can disagree about the nature of these intentions, but are united in rejecting the relevance of other factors, such as the speaker's gestures, her gaze, and any facts about the addressee or the audience. In this paper, I formulate a particular version of this view, and I defend it against six objections, old and new.

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Alex Radulescu
University of Missouri, Columbia


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