Abstract

The paper presents a synthesis of research results that focus on identifying factors that affect the organization and functioning of Iraq's air defense system during the Iraqi Freedom operation and, as a result, contributed to Iraq's defeat. An important part of the considerations presented in the article are the results of research relating to the role and significance of the use by the coalition partners of the state-of-the-art air weapon systems, which facilitated carrying out very precise strikes on the most essential elements of the Iraqi air defense system beyond the reach of the anti-aircraft artillery and missile systems. The authors also indicate that of the vital importance in the lack of adequate protection of the most important objects, the so-called centers of gravity, located mainly in Baghdad, were organizational errors in the distribution of forces and resources, technological problems, and inept command. The paper is concluded with a reflection on the gained knowledge on the influence of the experience gathered from the Iraqi Freedom operation on the processes of technological modernization of the armed forces, and especially air defense that is still based on the technology from the 1960s and 1970s.