Well-Being and the Priority of Values

Social Theory and Practice 36 (4):593-620 (2010)
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Abstract
Leading versions of hedonism generate implausible results about the welfare value of very intense or unwanted pleasures, while recent versions of desire satisfactionism overvalue the fulfillment of desires associated with compulsions and addictions. Consequently, both these theories fail to satisfy a plausible condition of adequacy for theories of well-being proposed by L.W. Sumner: they do not make one’s well-being depend on one’s own cares or concerns. But Sumner’s own life-satisfaction theory cannot easily be extended to explain welfare over time, and it makes mistaken self-assessment impossible. A new account of well-being based on the stable realization of personal values enjoys the advantages claimed for these subjective theories while avoiding these problems
ISBN(s)
0037-802X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RAIWAT
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Well-Being Policy: What Standard of Well-Being?Haybron, Daniel M. & Tiberius, Valerie

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