Another Argument Against Uniqueness
Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346 (2017)
Abstract
I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle: (roughly stated) If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle – viz. opposition to ‘epistemic consequentialism’ – is briefly discussed. The principle is extended to cover degrees of belief and compared with a couple of other well-known constraints on rational degrees of belief.Author's Profile
Reprint years
2016
DOI
10.1093/pq/pqw058
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2016-08-09
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2016-08-09
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397 (#22,711)
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62 (#19,201)
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