Abstract
Hauser argues that his pocket calculator (Cal) has certain arithmetical abilities: it seems Cal
calculates. That calculating is thinking seems equally untendentious. Yet these two claims together
provide premises for a seemingly valid syllogism whose conclusion - Cal thinks - most would deny. He
considers several ways to avoid this conclusion, and finds them mostly wanting. Either we ourselves
can't be said to think or calculate if our calculation-like performances are judged by the standards
proposed to rule out Cal; or the standards- e.g., autonomy and self-consciousness- make it impossible
to verify whether anything or anyone (save oneself) meets them. While appeals to the
intentionality of thought or the unity of minds provide more credible lines of resistance, available
accounts of intentionality and mental unity are insufficiently clear and warranted to provide very
substantial arguments against Cal's title to be called a thinking thing. Indeed, considerations favoring
granting that title are more formidable than is generally appreciated.
Rapaport's comments suggest that, on a strong view of thinking, mere calculating is not thinking
(and pocket calculators don't think), but on a weak, but unexciting, sense of thinking, pocket
calculators do think. He closes with some observations on the implications of this conclusion.