Meinong, Defective Objects, and Logical Paradox

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Abstract
Alexius Meinong developed a notion of defective objects in order to account for various logical and psychological paradoxes. The notion is of historical interest, since it presages recent work on the logical paradoxes by Herzberger and Kripke. But it fails to do the job it was designed for. However, a technique implicit in Meinong's investigation is more successful and can be adapted to resolve a similar paradox discovered by Romane Clark in a revised version of Meinong's Theory of Objects due to Rapaport. One family of paradoxes remains, but it is argued that they are unavoidable and relatively harmless.
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Archival date: 2017-03-20
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Logical Foundations for Belief Representation.William Rapaport - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (4):371-422.

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2017-02-17

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