Epistemic Humility and the Value of Acknowledging Ignorance in Skeptical Thought

Abstract

Epistemic humility, a cornerstone of philosophical and scientific inquiry, emphasizes the recognition of human fallibility and the provisional nature of knowledge. This concept contrasts with epistemic arrogance by promoting a humble acknowledgment of the limits of understanding and a willingness to revise beliefs in light of new evidence. Historical perspectives, from Socrates' dialogues to Descartes' methodological doubt and Hume's critique of induction, illustrate the evolution of epistemic humility as a critical component of skeptical thought. Philosophical reflections on intellectual virtues, such as curiosity and open-mindedness, underscore the importance of embracing uncertainty in the pursuit of truth. Contemporary discourse on epistemic humility addresses its role in scientific progress, public policy, and societal dialogue, highlighting its potential to foster intellectual integrity and informed decision-making amidst complexity and uncertainty.

Author's Profile

Nazim Qayoom
University of Mysore

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-06-21

Downloads
20 (#95,824)

6 months
20 (#94,385)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?