Realism in Theology and Metaphysics

In Conor Cunningham & Peter Candler (eds.), Belief and Metaphysics. SCM Press. pp. 323-344 (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The paper will have three sections. In section one I briefly present and respond to Byrne’s argument against theological realism. In section two, I present van Fraassen’s argument against analytic metaphysics and I show how, if sound, it constitutes a reason to reject both metaphysical and theological realism. In section three, I show how van Fraassen can be answered. Obviously what I am doing here falls far short of a full-blown defense of realism in either metaphysics or theology. But the objections raised by van Fraassen and Byrne are tokens of a type of objection that I think is rather widely endorsed among those who are suspicious of these two brands of realism. Thus, responding to those objections constitutes an important first step in the direction of a defense.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
REARIT
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-02-10
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-02-10

Total views
82 ( #26,981 of 40,615 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
37 ( #15,802 of 40,615 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.