The Fodorian fallacy
Analysis 62 (4):285-89 (2002)
Abstract
In recent years Fodor has repeatedly argued that nothing epistemic can be essential to, or constitutive of, any concept. This holds in virtue of a constraint which Fodor dubs the Compositionality Constraint. I show that Fodor's argument is fallacious because it rests on an ambiguity.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1111/1467-8284.00369
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2009-01-28
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2009-01-28
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358 (#25,159)
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15 (#58,845)
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