The Fodorian fallacy
Analysis 62 (4):285-89 (2002)
Abstract
In recent years Fodor has repeatedly argued that nothing epistemic can be essential to, or constitutive of, any concept. This holds in virtue of a constraint which Fodor dubs the Compositionality Constraint. I show that Fodor's argument is fallacious because it rests on an ambiguity.
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References found in this work BETA
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Fodor, Jerry
Language, Thought and Compositionality.Fodor, Jerry
Citations of this work BETA
Learnability and Compositionality.Patterson, Douglas
The Notion of a Recognitional Concept and Other Confusions.Dahlgrün, Malte
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2009-01-28
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20 ( #24,887 of 40,618 )
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