The Fodorian fallacy

Analysis 62 (4):285-89 (2002)
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In recent years Fodor has repeatedly argued that nothing epistemic can be essential to, or constitutive of, any concept. This holds in virtue of a constraint which Fodor dubs the Compositionality Constraint. I show that Fodor's argument is fallacious because it rests on an ambiguity.
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Science and Values.Brown, Harold I. & Laudan, Larry

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