The Fodorian fallacy
Analysis 62 (4):285-89 (2002)
Abstract
In recent years Fodor has repeatedly argued that nothing epistemic can be essential to, or constitutive of, any concept. This holds in virtue of a constraint which Fodor dubs the Compositionality Constraint. I show that Fodor's argument is fallacious because it rests on an ambiguity.
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2009-01-28
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301 ( #15,219 of 51,477 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #38,391 of 51,477 )
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