Aristotle's Four Causes of Action

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):213-227 (2019)
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Aristotle’s typical procedure is to identify something's four causes. Intentional action has typically been treated as an exception: most think that Aristotle has the standard causalist account, according to which an intentional action is a bodily movement efficiently caused by an attitude of the appropriate sort. I show that action is not an exception to Aristotle’s typical procedure: he has the resources to specify four causes of action, and thus to articulate a powerful theory of action unlike any other on offer.

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Bryan C. Reece
Baylor University


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