A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism

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Abstract
This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.
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2014, 2015
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REIASR
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
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References found in this work BETA
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Hieronymi, Pamela
The Domain of Reasons.Skorupski, John

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2014-01-13

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