Disagreement, Cognitive Command, and the Indexicality of Moral Truth

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 42 (1):7-16 (2015)
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Moral Relativism can be considered an attractive alternative to realism because relativists can make good sense of cultural and societal disagreements by seeing them as faultless. However, we can show that this advantage is made possible by systematically disagreeing with moral phenomenology. Relativists make a substantial distinction between intercultural and intracultural discourses which turns out to be incoherent. This can be shown by making use of Crispin Wright’s notion of Cognitive Command.

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Bastian Reichardt
Universität Bonn


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