Misinformation and disagreement

In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter addresses the relationship between misinformation and disagreement. We begin by arguing that one traditional bogeyman in this domain, ideological polarization, does not account for the many problems that have been documented. Instead, affective polarization seems to be the root cause of most of these problems. We then discuss the relationships between moral outrage, misinformation, and affective polarization. We next turn to the political implications of affective polarization and conclude by discussing some potential solutions to the problems that arise in this area.

Author Profiles

Ritsaart Reimann
Macquarie University
Mark Alfano
Macquarie University

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-08-15

Downloads
18 (#94,973)

6 months
11 (#94,110)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?