Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism

Logos and Episteme 6 (4):429-448 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to moral testimony pessimists, the testimony of moral experts does not provide non-experts with normative reasons for belief. Moral testimony optimists hold that it does. We first aim to show that moral testimony optimism is, to the extent such things may be shown, the more natural view about moral testimony. Speaking roughly, the supposed discontinuity between the norms of moral beliefs and the norms of non-moral beliefs, on careful reflection, lacks the intuitive advantage that it is sometimes supposed to have. Our second aim is to highlight the difference in the nature of the pragmatic reasons for belief that support moral testimony optimism and moral testimony pessimism, setting out more clearly the nature and magnitude of the challenge for the pessimist.
Categories
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
REIMRF
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 3 (2017-01-08)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Moral Understanding and Knowledge.Amber Riaz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):113-128.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-02-06

Total views
258 ( #10,473 of 38,076 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
49 ( #7,757 of 38,076 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.