A New Peircean Response to Radical Skepticism

Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):15-22 (2018)
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Abstract
The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically fed illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism inspired by C. S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and presents a better Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I still know things I ordinarily claim to know. Although it will emerge that this reply appears similar to a classic contextualist response to radical skepticism, it avoids two central problems facing that response.
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First archival date: 2017-12-31
Latest version: 2 (2018-02-22)
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2017-12-31

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