Nietzsche's Conception of Truth: Correspondence, Coherence, or Pragmatist?

Journal of Nietzsche Studies 46 (2):239-248 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Nearly every common theory of truth has been attributed to Nietzsche, while some commentators have argued that he simply has no theory of truth. This essay argues that Nietzsche's remarks on truth are best situated within either the coherence or pragmatist theories of truth rather than the correspondence theory. Nietzsche's thoughts on truth conflict with the correspondence framework because he believes that the truth conditions of propositions are constitutively dependent on our actions.

Author's Profile

Justin Remhof
Old Dominion University


Added to PP

499 (#37,951)

6 months
122 (#39,803)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?