Nietzsche's Conception of Truth: Correspondence, Coherence, or Pragmatist?

Journal of Nietzsche Studies 46 (2):239-248 (2015)
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Abstract
Nearly every common theory of truth has been attributed to Nietzsche, while some commentators have argued that he simply has no theory of truth. This essay argues that Nietzsche's remarks on truth are best situated within either the coherence or pragmatist theories of truth rather than the correspondence theory. Nietzsche's thoughts on truth conflict with the correspondence framework because he believes that the truth conditions of propositions are constitutively dependent on our actions.
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Archival date: 2018-08-11
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