Buddhist Reductionism and Free Will: Paleo-compatibilism

Journal of Buddhist Ethics 19:33-95 (2012)
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Abstract
A critical review of Mark Siderits's arguments in support of a compatibilist Buddhist theory of free will based on early Abhidharma reductionism and the two-truths distinction between conventional and ultimate truths or reality, which theory he terms 'paleo-compatibilism'. The Buddhist two-truths doctrine is basically analogous to Sellers' distinction between the manifest and scientific images, in which case the argument is that determinism is a claim about ultimate reality, whereas personhood and agency are about conventional reality, both discourse domains are semantically insulated, and thus there cannot be any issue of the incompatibility.
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Simplicity.Baker, Alan

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