The Counterfactual Theory of Free Will: A Genuinely Deterministic Form of Soft Determinism

Saarbr├╝cken, Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing (2010)
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Abstract
I argue for a soft compatibilist theory of free will, i.e., such that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism, directly opposite hard incompatibilism, which holds free will incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism. My intuitions in this book are primarily based on an analysis of meditation, but my arguments are highly syncretic, deriving from many fields, including behaviorism, psychology, conditioning and deconditioning theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, simulation theory, etc. I offer a causal/functional analysis of meta-mental control, or 'metacausality', cashed out in counterfactual terms, to solve what I call the easy problem of free will.
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How the Mind Works.Pinker, Steven
Free Will and Luck.Mele, Alfred R.
Freedom Evolves.Dennett, Daniel Clement

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