Grounds and ‘Grounds’

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):631-655 (2017)
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Abstract
In this paper, I offer a new theory of grounding. The theory has it that grounding is a job description that is realized by different properties in different contexts. Those properties play the grounding role contingently, and grounding is the property that plays the grounding role essentially. On this theory, grounding is monistic, but ‘grounding’ refers to different relations in different contexts. First, I argue against Kit Fine’s monist univocalism. Next, I argue against Jessica Wilson’s pluralist multivocalism. Finally, I introduce monist multivocalism, explicate three versions of it (of which the above is one), and show its advantages.
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First archival date: 2017-01-31
Latest version: 2 (2019-03-11)
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On What Grounds What.Schaffer, Jonathan

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