Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles about Material Objects

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Abstract
Mereological nihilism is the view that no objects have proper parts. Despite how counter‐intuitive it is, it is taken quite seriously, largely because it solves a number of puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects – or so its proponents claim. In this article, I show that for every puzzle that mereological nihilism solves, there is a similar puzzle that (a) it doesn’t solve, and (b) every other solution to the original puzzle does solve. Since the solutions to the new puzzles apply just as well to the old puzzles, the old puzzles provide no motivation to be a mereological nihilist.
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Archival date: 2018-03-15
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Against Parthood.Sider, Theodore
Parthood.Sider, Theodore
Brutal Composition.Markosian, Ned

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2018-03-08

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