Effective Sceptical Hypotheses

Theoria 79 (3):262-278 (2013)
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Abstract
The familiar Cartesian sceptical arguments all involve an explanation of our experiences. An account of the persuasive power of the sceptical arguments should explain why this is so. This supports a diagnosis of the error in Cartesian sceptical arguments according to which they mislead us into regarding our perceptual beliefs as if they were justified as inferences to the best explanation. I argue that they have instead a perceptual justification that does not involve inference to the best explanation and that should not be put in doubt by the sceptical hypotheses
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Vison.Marr, David
Epistemic Luck.Pritchard, Duncan

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2012-07-14

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