Contingenza o validità universale? Rorty e Apel sul progresso morale

Annali di Studi Religiosi 12:171-183 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper examines two contemporary answers to the question of whether moral values and norms are apt for rational criticism and justification: Richard Rorty’s radically contextualist approach—which is centered around the notion of contingency and is characterized by a dismissal of all claims to philosophical justification—and Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic version of discourse ethics—which encompasses highly ambitious claims to justification and universal validity. Contrasting the key theses of Rorty’s contextualism with those of Apel’s universalist discourse ethics and reconstructing their respective conceptions of moral progress we argue that neither Rorty’s nor Apel’s position is convincing.

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Boris Rähme
Fondazione Bruno Kessler

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