Compulsory Voting and Symbolic Representation

Public Affairs Quarterly 35 (2):140-159 (2021)
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Abstract

A prominent defence of compulsory voting is based on the negative effects of a low turnout on democracy, which leads to an unequal representation of the most vulnerable citizens of our societies, since they are the least likely to vote voluntarily. This paper shows that this justification relies on the truth of an added premise – that voting is a proxy for use of political influence and power. However, the inclusion of this premise weakens the entire argument, which regains consistency only through the adoption of a narrow understanding of what representation is. Introduction

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Stanislas Richard
Universidad San Sebastián

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