Nietzsche's Pluralism about Consciousness

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In this paper I argue that Nietzsche's view on consciousness is best captured by distinguishing different notions of consciousness. In other words, I propose that Nietzsche should be read as endorsing pluralism about consciousness. First, I consider the notion that is preeminent in his work and argue that the only kind of consciousness which may fit the characterization Nietzsche provides of this dominant notion is self-consciousness. Second, I argue that in light of Nietzsche's treatment of perceptions and sensations we should conclude that he takes each of such state types to involve a specific kind of consciousness which differs from Sconsciousness. I label these two additional kinds of consciousness perceptual consciousness and qualitative consciousness, respectively. I conclude the paper with some remarks on how, in Nietzsche's picture, these three different kinds of consciousness might relate
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Archival date: 2019-05-15
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