Maximising Expected Value Under Axiological Uncertainty. An Axiomatic Approach

Dissertation, Oxford (2015)
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The topic of this thesis is axiological uncertainty – the question of how you should evaluate your options if you are uncertain about which axiology is true. As an answer, I defend Expected Value Maximisation (EVM), the view that one option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. More precisely, I explore the axiomatic foundations of this view. I employ results from state-dependent utility theory, extend them in various ways and interpret them accordingly, and thus provide axiomatisations of EVM as a theory of axiological uncertainty.

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Stefan Riedener
University of Zürich


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