Against Radical Credal Imprecision

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165 (2013)
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Abstract
A number of Bayesians claim that, if one has no evidence relevant to a proposition P, then one's credence in P should be spread over the interval [0, 1]. Against this, I argue: first, that it is inconsistent with plausible claims about comparative levels of confidence; second, that it precludes inductive learning in certain cases. Two motivations for the view are considered and rejected. A discussion of alternatives leads to the conjecture that there is an in-principle limitation on formal representations of belief: they cannot be both fully accurate and maximally specific
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
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